Unregulated electoral propaganda for the Senate and CDEP

For both the parliamentary and presidential elections, I served as an internal observer on behalf of the Funky Citizens association, participating in the observation of the elections from the perspective of compliance with electoral law during both the physical operations and the procedural aspects.
In the context of the current year's elections being heavily debated, and public institutions seemingly applying the law arbitrarily, it is imperative to increase transparency regarding the measures taken by the authorities in charge of identifying violations and the actions I have taken to identify and facilitate the detection of electoral violations.
Summarize video
It is recommended to verify the data and conclusions before engaging in conspiracy theories or speculation on the subject to prevent errors.
So, do not disclose the entire picture regarding electoral expenses, only those for active campaigning after the legal deadline has passed.
It is legal to "denigrate" candidates for any elected position through propaganda, even if it is immoral, so the respective amounts were not included in the calculation.
Any person targeted by the analysis for the parliamentary elections can contact me via email at [email protected] with the information I wish to be included at the end of the article, in the "Right of Reply" section.
You can also submit videos, images, links, and I will attach them to give you the opportunity to express your opinion.
The other articles in the analysis:

Methodology used
The standard methodologies for qualitative analysis would not work in the case of analyzing forms of electoral propaganda, as traditional sentiment and keyword analysis are ineffective for a complex message such as that of masked electoral propaganda.
Thus, I proceeded to develop a methodology in which I utilized language analysis techniques using NLP models - specifically, I employed the Claude-3.5-Sonnet model, and then I reduced costs during the analysis of the propaganda related to the parliamentary elections using the Gemini 1.5-Flash-002 model, both of which are state-of-the-art (the best on the market).
The data was collected automatically, without manual processing, and the entire analysis process was detailed step by step on GitHub, in complete transparency.
So, if you wish to view the code used, below you have all the information, with the timestamps provided by Github to clarify that this was not a post-factum analysis to favor anyone or a select few:
Data collection method
Following the Cambridge Analytica incident, which was one of the key factors that influenced BREXIT, META has made its advertising more transparent to reduce the risk of voter manipulation.
What does this mean? All paid advertisements discussing political and social issues (which are likely to have electoral purposes or to "prepare" the population) must be reported on Facebook.
Facebook will refuse to publish unmarked ads or will block unmarked ads that initially passed the first filter. I also speak from personal experience as a marketer on META platforms, Google, etc.
On the last day before the elections, and during the elections, any form of "encouragement to vote" for a specific candidate or "discouragement" from voting for a specific candidate is prohibited. whether it is implicit or explicit.
Initially, I used the .csv files that can be obtained (maximum quantity 3) using the export button in META, searching for all specific keywords related to the names of all political candidates, from Georgescu to Lasconi to Simion to Ciolacu to Geoana. They contained fewer details, but still enough to report violations regarding electoral legislation.
With this, I prepared the first report, which was submitted to the police. Subsequently, during the parliamentary elections, I employed a more efficient technique, which is described below.
So, all the necessary information for identifying and sanctioning electoral propaganda is public and permanently stored by Meta on Ad Library.

To use an API for accessing data from the Ad Library, you must request approval from META, which can take months (around 3 months). Therefore, we proceeded to use a third-party provider that utilizes this API.

I have obtained a dataset that looks something like this (Note - edited version to include the reasons):
Data processing mechanism
As I described above, a traditional (manual) analysis would have been prone to my own subjectivity or that of other analysts, as well as being costly and slow.
So, we proceeded to use some AI prompts based on the law regarding electoral propaganda that describes what electoral propaganda is:
Brief discussion on legislation
LEGE nr. 370 din 20 septembrie 2004 (**republicată**)
Articolul 55:
Constituie contravenții, dacă acestea nu constituie infracțiuni, următoarele fapte:
[...]
t) continuarea propagandei electorale după încheierea acesteia, precum și sfătuirea în ziua votării a alegătorilor la sediul secțiilor de votare să voteze sau să nu voteze un anumit candidat;
[...]
Articolul 56:
(1) Contravențiile prevăzute la art. 55 lit. b), c), d), e), g), j), k), l), m), o), p), ș), ț), u), v), z), ab) și ac) se sancționează cu amendă de la 1.000 lei la 2.500 lei, cele de la lit. f), h), q), t), w), x) și aa), cu amendă de la 1.500 lei la 4.500 lei, cele de la lit. a), i), n), r), r^1), s) și y), cu amendă de la 4.500 lei la 10.000 lei.
[...]
LEGE nr. 334 din 17 iulie 2006, Art 36:
(7) Este considerat material de propagandă electorală orice material scris, audio sau video, care îndeplinește următoarele condiții:
a) se referă în mod direct la un candidat sau partid politic care participă la alegeri sau referendum, clar identificat;
b) este utilizat în perioada campaniei electorale, stabilită potrivit legilor privitoare la organizarea alegerilor;
c) are obiectiv electoral și se adresează publicului larg;
d) depășește limitele activității jurnalistice de informare a publicului.
In short, if you are conducting electoral campaigning, The fine is between 1,500 and 4,500 RON. Propaganda is any non-journalistic material aimed at influencing elections.
The Central Electoral Offices have issued their own "interpretative decisions," which are illegal as they violate the principle of legality. You cannot modify or annul parts of a law through an administrative act; it would be like me, as a mayor, saying that in my city it is permissible to kill people without criminal penalties, and that the police would actually enforce it.
Another reason for illegality is the lack of institutional competence, as the BEC is not superior to the police authorities and does not have authority over them. Therefore, the BEC cannot dictate the actions of the police, as they are neither prosecutors nor police captains. In a democratic state, the principle of separation of powers is upheld, which is particularly important during election periods.
Even so, highlight that the vast majority of violations also fell under the decisions of the BEC. Even though we consider these to be ILLEGAL, they are sensible and fundamentally correct (and were taken into account by the AI anyway).
How we educated the AI about interpretation
We have tried to build a correct, impartial AI model that can judge. when in doubt, for the accused to favor the defendants (in contravention matters).
The prompt, in .txt format, can be accessed below and checked individually:
In short, I mentioned the legislative provisions so that the model had to verify the cumulative fulfillment of the following conditions:
Based on the provided document, I will continue the explanation of how you structured the AI training for analyzing electoral propaganda. Here are the cumulative conditions that the model must verify:
- Verification of the criteria in Art. 36(7):
- Direct reference to a candidate/party (No vague advertisements that do not mention names but rather specific attributes such as balance, verticality, etc.)
- The accessibility to the general public (i.e., they should not be targeted at a predetermined number of individuals. This was fulfilled by paid advertisements on Facebook and Instagram.)
- The electoral objective (i.e., they must intend to encourage the voting of a candidate/candidates/party or discourage the voting of a candidate/candidates/party)
- Exceeding the boundaries of journalistic activity (That is, they do not come with journalistic evidence, do not represent real information but "fake news" or unverified information such as "Tal Hanan," "Vote manipulation at Simion," etc.)
- Specific verification elements:
- The presence of a CMF code (Financial Mandatary Code) was mandatory according to the BEC. It is worth mentioning that the penalty was not stipulated as the annulment of the elections, according to the law.
- If it represents a legitimate personal opinion vs. propaganda - Here I included something sensible - it should not be a personal opinion, but rather effective propaganda aimed at manipulating voters. If it were a personal opinion, it would not have been included in the report.
- Checklist for inclusion/exclusion:
: Permitted communications such as:- Those targeting exclusively the parliamentary elections during the valid period
- Discussions about the roles and official activities of candidates that are not related to their status as candidates (e.g: Prime Minister Ciolacu has secured our entry into Schengen.)
- General communications regarding political issues (e.g: Romania is going through a difficult period and we need to address these issues, and I call on all candidates: to take action on X.)
- Educational content about the electoral process (e.g: To vote, place the folded ballot into the ballot box.)
- Legitimate journalistic material (e.g: Georgescu was previously investigated for promoting Antonescu, but received a verdict of non-prosecution.
: Prohibited communications such as:- Electoral propaganda after the legal period has ended
- Direct influence on voters at polling stations
- Alternative forms of propaganda that do not comply with legal requirements
- Principles of analysis:
- Impartiality in evaluation
- The application of the principle "in dubio pro reo"
- Focus on content and context
- Objective assessment of the electoral purpose
The model was encouraged to analyze step by step, using a chain of thought for each of the aspects described above, weighing the pros and cons, so that the model could assess the situation as neutrally and accurately as possible, with a minimal false positive rate.
I did this so that the model would not be disproportionately harsh on certain parties or candidates (e.g., Ciolacu is allowed to boast that he was a good prime minister, as long as he does not ask to be voted for because he was a good prime minister).
How did we run the AI model?
I have built a pipeline that analyzes each form of electoral propaganda using information from META, which includes:
- Demographic and audience data
- Information about age (age_audience)
- Distribution by gender and country
- Reach and impressions
- Information about the advertiser
- Page Name
- Page ID
- Page Category
- Verify page
- Followers and likes
- Information about the advertiser's profile
- Advertisement details
- Ad ID
- Running period (start_date, end_date)
- Budget (spend)
- Publishing platform
- Format and content
- Text and images used
- Compliance and regulatory information
- Information about the payer/beneficiary
- FEV Information (First Time Voter)
- Information about violations
- Moderation statuses
- Targeting and performance date
- Geographical distribution
- Reach metrics
- Engagement statistics
- Targeted countries and regions
In short, the model had access to both the image of the post and the text of the post, as well as information about the contact details of the person who promoted the advertisement, the budget paid, the platforms where the post was published, effectively everything needed for the proper sanctioning of violations.
Example of analysis conducted with AI
You are an AI model tasked with analyzing whether an incident falls under Article 98 t) of LEGE nr. 208 din 20 iulie 2015, regarding the continuation of electoral propaganda after its conclusion, as well as advising voters at polling stations on election day to vote or not to vote for a particular candidate.
First, let's establish the context. According to the law:
```
LEGE nr. 334 din 17 iulie 2006, Art 36:
(7) Este considerat material de propagandă electorală orice material scris, audio sau video, care îndeplinește următoarele condiții:
a) se referă în mod direct la un candidat sau partid politic care participă la alegeri sau referendum, clar identificat;
b) este utilizat în perioada campaniei electorale, stabilită potrivit legilor privitoare la organizarea alegerilor;
c) are obiectiv electoral și se adresează publicului larg;
d) depășește limitele activității jurnalistice de informare a publicului.
```
Article 98 t) specifically addresses the continuation of electoral propaganda after its conclusion, as well as advising voters at polling stations on election day to vote or not to vote for a particular candidate.
You will be provided with a description of a promoted facebook post (paid post). Your task is to analyze this post and determine whether it violates Article 98 t).
<allowed_ads>
- Ones that exclusively target the parliamentary elections, of which the propaganda period is still ongoing and allowed.
- Ones that discuss about other roles of a candidate, such as their official post (eg: Prime minister, deputy, etc), as long as it isn't related to the parliamentary elections.
- Ones that are general in nature, discussing political issues, but not directly related to the parliamentary elections.
- Ones that are educational in nature, providing information about the electoral process, voting procedures, etc.
- Ones that are journalistic in nature, providing news, analysis, or opinion pieces on political events, as long as they are not intended to influence the vote.
</allowed_ads>
<disallowed_ads>
- Ones that target the parliamentary elections, as the propaganda period has ended, and the law prohibits the continuation of electoral propaganda after its conclusion.
- Ones that advise voters at polling stations on election day to vote or not to vote for a particular candidate.
- Any other form of electoral propaganda that does not comply with the legal requirements.
</disallowed_ads>
<rules>
- Be impartial. No party or candidate should be favored in your analysis.
- Consider the legal requirements and definitions provided.
- Focus on the content of the post and its context.
- In dubio pro reo - when in doubt, favor the accused.
</rules>
<parliamentary_candidates>
no,partid,prescurtare
1,Partidul Social Democrat,PSD
2,Partidul S.O.S. România,SOS
3,Partidul Național Liberal,PNL
4,Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor,AUR
5,Forța Dreptei,FD
6,Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România,UDMR
7,Uniunea Salvați România,USR
8,Partidul Social Democrat Independent,PSDI
9,Partidul Național Conservator Român,PNCR
10,Partidul România în Acțiune,PRA
11,România Socialistă,RS
12,Partidul Social Democrat Unit,PSDU
13,Alternativa pentru Demnitate Națională,ADN
14,Reînnoim Proiectul European al României,REPER
15,Dreptate și Respect în Europa pentru Toți,DREPT
16,Alianța Național Creștină,ANC
17,Patrioții Poporului Român,PPR
18,Partidul Oamenilor Tineri,POT
19,Partidul Ecologist Român,PER
20,Sănătate Educație Natură Sustenabilitate,SENS
21,Partidul Noua România,PNR
22,Liga Acțiunii Naționale,PLAN
23,Partidul Republican din România,PRR
24,Partidul Oamenilor Credincioși,POC
25,Partidul Verde,PV
26,Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat,PNȚCD
27,Uniunea Geto-Dacilor,UGD
28,Partidul Patria,PP
29,Partidul Dreptății,PD
30,Partidul Pensionarilor Uniți,PPU
31,Partidul Phralipe al Romilor,PPR
</parliamentary_candidates>
You will be given a post in <post> object.
Please analyze the incident carefully, considering the following points. This must be a "thinking out loud" analysis, considering all possible angles and interpretations. Your final determination should be based on the provided context and the specific content of the post.
<analysis>
<has-cmf>Has a CMF number? This is often used by candidates, and is mandated to be used. If one is not present, it's not a big problem, it can be a non candidate. If one is present, it's propaganda. It can either be prepended with "CMF" or not. IT's usually put at the end of a post and is a series of numbers</has-cmf>
<refers-to-candidate>Identifies a parliamentary candidate (party or independent or party member participating in election) specifically, by name, surname, etc clearly - Check if "Article 36 (7) - a" applies</refers-to-candidate>
<addresses-the-wide-population>Verify if it addresses the wide population, meaning it's not personal communication but something intended to reach more people. Take into account these are paid posts, and on Facebook, a public platform</addresses-the-wide-population>
<electoral-objective>Does this intend to influence the amount of people voting for a candidate, is that the objective of the content? -Check if "Article 36 (7) - c" applies. Be thorough and objective -Check if "Article 36 (7) - c" applies </electoral-objective>
<journalism>Verify if this is more of a form of journalism/citizens' journalism, and it's intention is to educate and inform, following the standard of journalism</journalism>
<personal_opinion>A personal opinion which is not intended to influence the vote, but rather to express a personal opinion, even anger, is not propaganda. Check case by case, in context.</personal_opinion>
</analysis>
After your analysis, provide a detailed justification for your conclusion. Consider all relevant aspects of the incident and how they relate to the legal definition and requirements:
<conclusion>
<post_id>[Post id]</post_id>
<electoral-propaganda-analysis>
[PLease analyise, with pros and cons, if this is a form of electoral propaganda]
</electoral-propaganda-analysis>
<electoral-propaganda-decision>TRUE/FALSE</electoral-propaganda-decision>
<electoral-propaganda-candidates>
<candidate> <name>[Exact name of the candidate influenced, for example "ELENA-VALERICA LASCONI"]</name><impact>NEGATIVE/POSITIVE</impact></candidate> (multiple candidates allowed here)
</electoral-propaganda-candidates>
<responsible-party-or-group>[The shortened named of the parties - eg: PSD/PNL/INDEPENDENT/AUR/USR, etc]</responsible-party-or-group>
<message-for-police>
[In perfect Romanian language, please give a short, concise, yet clear argument on why this is a violation, as a lawyer would present in court]
[This will mention all of the liable parties. Must be empty for non-violations]
What to include here:
- Why it is not an allowed form of communication (does it fill all the criteria for propaganda, does it target the parliamentary elections, etc?)
- What is the electoral effect of this post and is the objective to influence the vote?
- Cite parts of the post that are problematic to fundament your argument.
- Mention the sums of money paid, according to Ad Library, contact information (if available), reached people to increase it's persuasiveness.
How to write it:
- Legal language, clear and concise.
- Persuasive, with clear arguments, yet not dramatic. Objective and neutral language.
What not to include here:
- The responsible part is the entity that paid for the post, not the candidate or party. It's the one that is legally responsible for the content.
Format: [Responsible byline], pentru incalcarea articolului 98 t) din LEGEA nr. 208 din 20 iulie 2015, prin [descriere clara a faptei punctuale], efectul electoral, practic toate punctele ce duc la incriminare, argumente pentru sustinerea, precum si ID-ul postarii pe facebook. Mentioneaza ca e dupa ora 18:00 pe 30.11.2024. Foloseste obligatoriu un format narativ, intr-un singur paragraf, fara bulletpoints.
</message-for-police>
</conclusion>
Finally, based on your analysis and justification, provide your determination on whether the incident violates Article 98 t).
Present your response in the following format:
<output>
<analysis>
[Your detailed analysis of the incident here]
</analysis>
<conclusion>
[Your final determination on whether the incident violates Article 98 t) here]
</conclusion>
</output>
As can be seen from the example above, the AI model addresses and verifies all essential aspects to identify what constitutes electoral propaganda and what does not.
Proof that the AI model and methodology are effective, even though some false positives may arise, which will be addressed by the analysis of the regulatory authority.
The following analysis is approximate, so it should be taken with a degree of critical thinking and not accepted at face value. However, it still serves as a preliminary filter before the actual analysis by the authority responsible for identifying violations, which must possess the maturity to assess issues objectively, based on legal grounds.
Analysis Results
False positive cases were likely prioritized.
Now that I have explained the analysis methodology, I believe it is important to see what it actually reveals. Below, we will present the aggregated results in the form of charts.
Information on each form of electoral propaganda has been reported individually.
I have followed the following parties in the parliamentary elections:
no,partid,prescurtare
1,Partidul Social Democrat,PSD
2,Partidul S.O.S. România,SOS
3,Partidul Național Liberal,PNL
4,Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor,AUR
5,Forța Dreptei,FD
6,Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România,UDMR
7,Uniunea Salvați România,USR
8,Partidul Social Democrat Independent,PSDI
9,Partidul Național Conservator Român,PNCR
10,Partidul România în Acțiune,PRA
11,România Socialistă,RS
12,Partidul Social Democrat Unit,PSDU
13,Alternativa pentru Demnitate Națională,ADN
14,Reînnoim Proiectul European al României,REPER
15,Dreptate și Respect în Europa pentru Toți,DREPT
16,Alianța Național Creștină,ANC
17,Patrioții Poporului Român,PPR
18,Partidul Oamenilor Tineri,POT
19,Partidul Ecologist Român,PER
20,Sănătate Educație Natură Sustenabilitate,SENS
21,Partidul Noua România,PNR
22,Liga Acțiunii Naționale,PLAN
23,Partidul Republican din România,PRR
24,Partidul Oamenilor Credincioși,POC
25,Partidul Verde,PV
26,Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat,PNȚCD
27,Uniunea Geto-Dacilor,UGD
28,Partidul Patria,PP
29,Partidul Dreptății,PD
30,Partidul Pensionarilor Uniți,PPU
31,Partidul Phralipe al Romilor,PPR
Candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, along with the abbreviation used, to facilitate the analysis of propaganda during presidential elections.
The complete PDF can be downloaded here:
False Positive Analysis
For the parliamentary campaign, I used a clearer data structure than that for the presidential campaign, specifically JSON files scraped using the API Library.
Some forms of political advertising are actually advertisements that have a political impact but are merely press, rather than propaganda. The AI algorithm considers not whether the name includes "PRESS" or similar terms, but whether they appear to be forms of defamation/promotion that do not adhere to ethical standards, such as verification, neutral language, etc.
All information is taken into account, including attached images, without an analysis of the video material.
False positives exist, as a methodology is used that broadly exposes the facts, requiring the authorities to objectively analyze the situation and to impose sanctions only to the extent that we are genuinely discussing propaganda.
Even in this situation, certain legitimate media channels have been sanctioned despite the uncertain propagandistic nature. Criticism of candidates is allowed, but there is a discussion regarding the level of bias in the articles.
Initial redirection of the petition regarding electoral propaganda - IGPR Cluj-Napoca
On December 1, 2024, the Cluj County Police Inspectorate responded to the complaint sent via email, confirming that it has taken over the administrative offense report regarding the violation of electoral legislation.
Considering that the issues raised in the document pertained to violations of electoral legislation committed across several counties, the Cluj Police Inspectorate decided to forward the case to the Criminal Investigation Directorate within the Romanian General Police Inspectorate for further investigations at the national level.

Secondary redirection of the petition regarding electoral propaganda - Criminal Investigation Directorate of the Romanian Police
As a result of the initial redirection, the Criminal Investigation Directorate confirmed through the letter dated December 17, 2024, the acceptance of the contravention complaint, registered under number 465938/09.12.2024.
For the efficiency of the investigation, the DIC has redistributed cases to the territorial police structures, based on the residence or registered office of the entities under investigation, for conducting additional checks and applying any potential contraventional sanctions.

TIMIS - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
The Timisoara Municipal Police has redirected the petition to the competent territorial sections, namely Section 5 and 2 of the Timisoara Police, Section 1 of the Ghiorda Rural Police, and Section 4 of the Peciu Nou Rural Police.

Analysis of the contravention act of RDMSZ Timis - Molnar Andras (UDMR)


The case reveals a systemic issue in the investigation of electoral law violations. The Dumbrăvița Police Station conducted a cursory check, limiting itself to examining the Facebook page "RMDSZ of Temes County", without analyzing the associated paid advertisements. In their address no. 798201/20.01.2025, they mention that they have not identified any violations, although:
- The existence of the contract between S.C. TRENDMARKER CONSULTING S.R.L. and UDMR Timiș has been discovered.
- The company administrator has been identified (Popa Alexandru Nicolae)
- They only checked the organic content of the page, ignoring the paid advertisement section.
In fact, this was the content of the complaint:

And this was our response, hoping that they will reconsider their answer:

BIHOR - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of the contravention of independent candidate Dorin Curtean

The Criminal Investigation Service within the Bihor County Police Inspectorate analyzed one of the specific cases from a broader series of electoral law violations initially reported in Cluj. According to address no. 843037/SIC/CIA/08.01.2025, investigators focused on a specific post promoting independent candidate Dorin Curtean (position 40 on the ballot).
The investigation revealed that the post with ID 263312579019212123, initially published on November 30, 2024, at 10:00 AM, continued to be actively promoted through paid advertising until 6:00 PM on the same day.
However, they argue that according to Decision No. 19D of the Central Electoral Bureau dated 19.09.2024, maintaining any type of electoral content on social media platforms after the conclusion of the electoral campaign constitutes a violation of regulations.

This was the reported electoral propaganda post:

Video clip - electoral propaganda for candidate Dorin Curtean, during the period when it is prohibited.
I am notified and guided to report the contraventions:

As a result of the request, DIE Bihor re-evaluated the posting and found the violation, which was subsequently sanctioned.

TELEORMAN - Sanctioning electoral propaganda forms for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of the contraventional facts of the publication "Total Impact" (for various parties)


Electoral propaganda forms for Total Impact, among the largest identified propagandists.
Even though Total Impact is among the largest propagandists, being responsible for 5 contraventions according to the AI analysis, they have been forgiven, although in our opinion, the vast majority of the actions were evident.

The cause of the results was the incomplete analysis conducted by them, as they did not analyze the posts using the Meta Ad Library, utilizing the links attached in the petition (by clicking).
The reported facts are as follows:





List of the 5 reported posts, according to the Library. (Click on the photo to enlarge)
Electoral propaganda targets and favors parties from PSD to Forta Dreptei, from USR to PNCR, even after the electoral campaign has ended, thus rendering the propaganda a violation.
We have not yet managed to send a response requesting a review of the analysis.
GALATI - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of the contraventions of the publication "A person with a disability as president" (for USR)

From the analysis of the documents, the following situation is presented:
The Municipal Police of Galați investigated a report regarding a paid post on Facebook made by the user with the address [email protected]The post contained a longer text about democracy and elections, concluding with the message "In the meantime, on December 1st and 8th, I will vote for the EU, for NATO, for democracy, for USR, for ELENA LASCONI, PRESIDENT!!!"


The response of the Galati police regarding the filed complaint
The authorities decided not to sanction this post, considering it an expression of a personal opinion regarding the voting intention. However, the situation presents several aspects that deserve closer analysis:
- The paid nature of the post (being a "promoted post" on Facebook) gives it a potential propaganda character, as the message is intentionally amplified through payment to reach a wider audience.
- According to Decision 19/D of the BEC, it is prohibited to "disseminate electoral messages... in visual format" and to "advise voters to vote or not to vote for certain candidates." Although the post is phrased in the first person ("I will vote"), the fact that it is promoted through payment could be interpreted as an attempt to influence voters.
- Although paragraph (4) of Decision 19/D provides an exception for messages that refer exclusively to presidential elections, this post explicitly mentions a political party (USR) participating in the parliamentary elections, thus falling outside the scope of this exception.

At the bottom of the decision, it may be well-founded, but it can attract criticism regarding the impartiality or discretionary degree of sanctioning contraventions, which seem to forgive some parties or candidates, or those who are unaware of the law.
While we uphold the view that personal opinions should not be penalized, personal opinions cannot include paid advertisements.
ARAD - Sanctioning of electoral propaganda forms for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of the candidate Sebastian Tiberiu Pop's contraventional facts

In this case, we observe a different approach from the authorities. The Arad Municipal Police investigated a report regarding a paid post on Facebook made by Sebastian Tiberiu Pop on November 30, 2024, after 07:00 AM.
The post promotes a legislative initiative regarding mandatory psychological control for candidates for public office; however, it has been deemed to have electoral characteristics given the context and timing of its publication.

Unlike the previous case in Galați, the authorities in Arad have decided to impose a contravention penalty for this post, in accordance with Article 98 letter T and Article 99 paragraph 1 of Law 208/2015. The decision seems justified because:
- This is a paid post (with a budget between 100-199 RON)
- Are promotional characteristics evident for a candidate?
- It targets a very large audience (estimated between 100,000 and 500,000 people).
- It was published after the conclusion of the electoral campaign.
- Use the position of "future deputy" to promote a legislative initiative

SATU MARE - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of potential contraventions by the publication Gazeta de Nord-Vest (Against PNL):

In this case, we have an interesting situation where Gazeta de Nord-Vest published two paid posts on Facebook after the conclusion of the electoral campaign (November 30, 2024), both directly targeting PNL Satu Mare members:
- First posting (ID 3870108766578700):
- Title: "Camorra of Satu Mare Part II. The Organized Criminal Group Surrounding PNL President Adrian Cozma"
- Cost: 500-599 RON
- Estimated audience: 45,000-50,000 views
- Clear negative character towards candidate Adrian Cozma
- The second post (ID 427523277100495):
- Refer to Adrian Cozma, Nicolae Cornea, and Șerban Zoro Călin
- Cost: 800-899 RON
- Estimated audience: 50,000-60,000 views
- Focus on Satu Mare County

It is interesting that, although these appear to be clear attempts to influence the vote through negative materials about PNL candidates, the response from the Satu Mare Police (no. 447825/16.01.2025) deemed that the articles "fall within the freedom of expression and the public's right to be informed" and that no criminal or administrative offenses were identified.
This decision seems to contrast with the previous case in Arad, where a promotional post was sanctioned. Here, although the posts have an evident electoral character and are paid to reach a wide audience, the authorities chose to classify them under the protection of press freedom.


However, there are several clear indications that these posts represent electoral propaganda disguised as "news":
- Suspicious financial aspects:
- The budgets are unusually high for standard press advertising: 500-599 RON + 800-899 RON, with the total approaching 1500 RON.
- From a business perspective, it is not justifiable to spend such amounts on promoting ordinary press articles.
- The precise target area and large budget suggest external funding for electoral purposes.
- Timing and targeting:
- Posts appear strategically after the campaign concludes (30.11.2024)
- Precise geographical targeting in Satu Mare County
- Estimated very large audience (45,000-60,000 views) for a local publication
- Focus editorial suspect:
- Both posts exclusively target the PNL and its members.
- There are no similar posts about other parties.
- Using emotive and accusatory language ("Camorra", "organized crime group")
- Exclusive focus on negative aspects
- Coordinate pattern:
- Two separate but timed coordinated posts
- Significant total budget for both
- Clear strategy to maximize negative impact on PNL
- Technical aspects:
- Posts are "boosted" for maximum reach
- Precise demographic targeting
- Multiple platforms used (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp)
All of this suggests a coordinated and funded campaign with a clear electoral purpose, disguised as investigative journalism. The police's decision to regard it as "freedom of expression" seems questionable in this context.
Furthermore, by investigating the published content, it is proven that we are discussing 9 posts with defamatory character; however, these were not authorized during electoral periods:


One aspect to consider is whether we are discussing an animosity whose role is not to alter the outcome of the election, particularly the longevity of the campaign, which, although it has a derogatory and clearly subjective character, has been ongoing for more than a year.
If the role was to discredit the PNL, this strategy has been carried out for over a year.
However, we consider that the case is debatable, so that we cannot criticize the analysis conducted by the police, which may still be thorough, especially given that they have likely interviewed the involved parties.
GORJ - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of the contraventional facts of the publication Tele3media (for the Force of the Right):
An interesting case of alleged electoral propaganda has emerged in Gorj County. The local television station Tele 3 Media invested a considerable amount - between 2000 and 2500 RON - in a Facebook advertisement promoting "The Right Force Team" during the period of November 28 to December 1, 2024, which is immediately after the official end of the electoral campaign.
The advertisement had a significant impact, reaching between 70,000 and 80,000 impressions and specifically targeting the population of Gorj County. Meta (Facebook) deemed that this advertisement violated the platform's rules regarding "local illegal content" and removed it.

However, when the case reached the Gorj County Police Inspectorate, the authorities had a different interpretation. In their response to the complainant (document no. 712810/19.12.2024), the police state that "the issues you raised are not confirmed, and no violation of the applicable legislation has been found."
This decision is surprising for several reasons:
- The invested amount is unusually high for a local advertisement.
- The timing is suspicious, coming right after the campaign ended.
- The content was explicitly political, promoting a specific party.
- Even the Facebook platform deemed the content problematic.
We have a situation where the same content is interpreted differently by two authorities: Meta considers it illegal and removes it, while the police find no violation.
Illegal electoral propaganda for the Gorj Senate - for candidate Nicolae Davitoiu

We have not yet requested a requalification of the facts, as we do not know from the response which point it refers to, analyzing only by elimination which fact has been examined.
SUCEAVA - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
The Suceava County Police distanced itself from any form of law enforcement, refusing to sanction the entirety of the reported actions:

A detailed investigation of political advertisements on Facebook revealed a coordinated electoral propaganda campaign conducted in Suceava after the official end of the campaign. At least nine different political ads were broadcast simultaneously after 6:00 PM on November 30, 2024, all targeting voters in the Suceava region.
Moldova Invest, based in Suceava, was the most active promoter, publishing five different advertisements. These ranged from the indirect promotion of Mayor Ion Ticușor Vasiliu from Petricani to an "analysis" of the PSD candidate Ciprian Șerban. The platform alternated between promoting PSD candidates and attacking PNL leaders in Iași, Alexandru Muraru and Florin Alexe.
At the same time, "Your Information" focused on the PSD candidates from Suceava, promoting through seemingly journalistic interviews the team composed of Larisa Blanari, Mirela Adomnicăi, George Mândruță, and Cristian Șologon. A separate campaign was exclusively dedicated to the PSD candidate Larisa Blanari.
The strategy also included other publications that promoted candidates from various parties, such as the PNL candidate Valeriu Iftime in the Botoșani-Iași-Suceava area and the REPER candidate Ștefan Cîmpean in Suceava. All advertisements utilized seemingly small budgets, under 100 RON, but targeted large audiences, ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 people.

While Meta has removed most of these ads for "local illegal content," Romanian authorities, through IPJ Suceava, have determined that "the reported issues are not confirmed."
The authorities' response to this coordinated propaganda campaign raises serious questions.
While the Meta platform identified and removed these ads as "local illegal content," the Suceava Police Inspectorate concluded that there are no "violations of the current legislation." This discrepancy is all the more striking given that the evidence is substantial:
All advertisements were published simultaneously (after 6:00 PM on November 30, 2024), suggesting coordination. The total amount invested, although fragmented into seemingly small ads, indicates a substantial campaign. The precise geographic targeting and estimated audience (100,000-500,000 people per ad) demonstrate a clear intention to influence the vote.
Moreover, the content of the advertisements is explicitly electoral. For example, the ad for the PSD candidate Ciprian Șerban used the slogan "Vote for the safe path for Neamț," while Valeriu Iftime's promotion included direct calls such as "We need full mobilization for the parliamentary elections" and "Position 1 on the ballot."
The scope and coordination of these campaigns, although fragmented into seemingly small and independent ads, suggest a sophisticated strategy to circumvent electoral legislation, a strategy that appears to have been effective against the Romanian authorities.
The police's decision to overlook these obvious aspects raises serious questions about:
- The technical capacity of authorities to investigate online propaganda
- The political will to sanction such violations
In a context where even a private company (Meta) was able to identify and act against these violations, the lack of action from the authorities suggests either a misunderstanding of the digital environment or a possible tolerance of illegal practices in the electoral campaign.
This case sets a troubling precedent for future elections, suggesting that masked electoral propaganda online may continue without consequences, despite explicit legal restrictions.


ARGES - Sanctioning electoral propaganda forms for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Analysis of the contraventional facts concerning the PNL candidate Mrs. Alina Gorghiu (former Minister of Justice)
A person whom I have a good faith opinion about, responsible for the measures taken regarding our investigations into the ONRC blockage, has also been guilty of electoral propaganda on several occasions, both in favor of candidate Calin Georgescu and for himself and the PNL.
More details about the investigation in which she was partially responsible for the recovery of ONRC are below:



The case of Alina Gorghiu is particularly relevant in the context of post-campaign electoral propaganda, especially considering her position as Minister of Justice at that time.
The data shows that Mrs. Gorghiu spent between 500-599 RON on a Facebook ad (ID 2558185481042152) that contained the explicit electoral message "Give us the chance, on December 1st, to regain your trust!" alongside her image and that of Ilie Bolojan, explicitly mentioning "No. 4 on the ballot." A second post (ID 561393536849758), with a budget between 600-699 RON, contained the direct call "On Sunday, vote for the PNL team!"
These advertisements have reached a significant audience:
- 80,000-90,000 impressions for the first advertisement
- 90,000-100,000 impressions for the second
- An estimated target audience of 100,000-500,000 individuals
What makes this particular case noteworthy is Mrs. Gorghiu's official position at that time. As the Minister of Justice, she was responsible for ensuring compliance with the law, including electoral legislation.

Meta has removed ads for "local illegal content," but, similar to other cases in Romania, Romanian authorities have not taken any action. This case highlights a systemic issue in the enforcement of electoral law, where even high-ranking officials seem to ignore restrictions on post-campaign electoral propaganda.
The situation raises serious questions about the double standard in law enforcement and the effectiveness of electoral regulations when they are violated even by those responsible for enforcing them.

The response from the Argeș Police Inspectorate regarding Alina Gorghiu highlights a problematic aspect of investigating online electoral propaganda. The police justify the lack of sanctions with two main arguments:
- "No concrete data has been identified to establish the timing and conditions of the announcement's publication."
- At the time of registering the complaint, the post on the Facebook application with ID 2558185481042152 was no longer available.
This justification is debatable for several reasons:
- First, the Meta Ad Library keeps a complete history of ads, including the exact timing, amounts spent (500-599 RON), and impact (80,000-90,000 impressions). This data is public and verifiable.
- The fact that the advertisement was no longer available at the time of reporting should not hinder the investigation - the Meta Ad Library retains this information precisely for transparency and subsequent verification.
- Additionally, there is a second advertisement (ID 561393536849758) that cost between 600-699 RON and had a similar impact, demonstrating a pattern of behavior.
It is concerning that the police cite a lack of access to information that is, in fact, public and verifiable. Furthermore, given that this involves the Minister of Justice in office at the time, this superficial approach to the investigation raises serious questions about the impartiality of law enforcement.
Compared to similar cases in Romania, there is a consistent pattern where authorities seem to avoid thorough investigation of these violations, despite the existence of clear and public evidence.
BRASOV - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Mr. David F. Dragos, questionable electoral propaganda for USR against PNL

In this case from Brașov, we observe an interesting situation of indirect electoral propaganda. David Dragoș-Florin, although not a candidate, published an advertisement on Facebook (ID 885034927154689) after the conclusion of the electoral campaign, on November 30, 2024, targeting the candidacy of Elena-Valeria Lasconi and PNL Brașov.
The post, although seemingly critical of the PNL Brașov's lack of position regarding Ilie Bolojan's support for Elena Lasconi, represents a subtle form of electoral propaganda. With a relatively modest budget (under 100 RON), the advertisement generated between 3,000 and 4,000 impressions, targeting a potential audience of 100,000 to 500,000 people.

IPJ Brașov, in its response (no. 793774/14.01.2025), states that "measures have been taken in accordance with the legal provisions in force" without specifying the nature of these measures. It is noteworthy that the response is vague and avoids clarifying whether sanctions have been applied or not.
This case illustrates a more subtle form of electoral propaganda, where the political message is conveyed indirectly, through criticism and irony ("What a change! European values!"), rather than through direct support for a candidate.
Although the invested amount is relatively small, the precise geographical targeting and timing of the posting suggest a clear intention to influence public opinion in the post-campaign period.
DOLJ - Sanctioning forms of electoral propaganda for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
Indiscret Media LLC, false positive regarding electoral propaganda

"Indiscret in Oltenia" published two posts that, although discussing candidates and elections, actually represent legitimate journalistic content:
- The first post raises a legitimate question about the votes received by Călin Georgescu, inviting debate and analysis ("Are we witnessing a manipulation of proportions or are the votes received [...] merely a reaction?")
- The second post presents an analysis of the results from Oltenia, focusing on the electoral performance in the region.
The AI model identified this post as electoral propaganda, although in the opinion of the publication and the authority that established the offense, it is not.


At first glance, SC Indiscret Media SRL is not guilty of any electoral propaganda act, acting lawfully.
The police response acknowledged these aspects and correctly concluded, in context, without penalizing the free press.

The IPJ Dolj correctly analyzed the situation, concluding that these posts do not constitute electoral propaganda, but rather represent legitimate journalistic activity. The police's response is well-founded because:
- The posts do not encourage voting for or against any candidate.
- The content is analytical and investigative
- It falls within the freedom of expression and the public's right to be informed.
- It represents legitimate journalism, not disguised propaganda.
Conclusion:
So far, less than 40% of the facts have been analyzed, likely the largest sanctions/solutions are yet to come. I hope that the measures will be taken by the police before the statute of limitations for the contravention liability, which quickly comes into effect in 6 months.
There are indications of delay, with the complaint regarding the presidential elections lacking a response, while those for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are being postponed, with no measures taken.
The arguments regarding the impossibility of analyzing the facts are clearly incorrect, as the analysis can be conducted online, with the data being permanently stored. They have generated a delay only to use it as a reason to disregard the law, in the opinion of the editorial team.
Reading the 100+ cases of electoral propaganda identified by AI
Below, you will find the petition submitted to the authorities for the assessment of contraventions.